Glossary

Glossary

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A dictionary of terms and detailed explanations regarding the functioning of state security organizations facilitates the interpretation of published data.

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PERLUSTRACJA KORESPONDENCJI

Perlustracja korespondencji (Praca “W”) "W" service – i.e. postal censorship.

PLAN OBSERWACJI

Plan obserwacji (surveillance plan) a document prepared by the Security Service (SB) "B" division unit describing the activities for executing the surveillance of a person (object) ordered by the SB operative unit. Surveillance plans, as internal documentation of the "B" division unit, were not included in the operative case files of the invigilated persons/observed objects.

PLAN OPERACYJNEJ OCHRONY TAJNEGO PRZESZUKANIA (TAJNEGO OTWARCIA ZAMKÓW) | PLAN OF THE OPERATIVE SECURING OF THE COVERT ENTRY (COVERT LOCK OPENING)

Plan operacyjnej ochrony tajnego przeszukania (tajnego otwarcia zamków) (Plan of the operative securing of the covert entry (covert lock opening)) an operative plan form for a covert search (tajne przeszukanie, TP) or a TP combined with a covert entry. A TP operative securing plan was an appendix to the request for a covert search (lock opening, i.e. covert entry).

PLAN OPERACYJNY | OPERATIVE PLAN

Plan operacyjny (Operative plan) 1. The term "operative plan" referred to projects relating to the operative work of Security Service (SB) units; work plans were to "[...] specify operative undertakings and determine the use of means and resources for this purpose". The operative working plan was to "[...] specify: the objective, the method of achieving it, the force and resources, the deadlines for solving long-term and current operative work problems, and the supervision of the implementation of these plans". The 1970 operative instruction distinguishes two types of operative working plans: periodic problem plans, drawn up at regular intervals (usually annually), containing the "basic directions of operative activities"; periodic problem plans were termed “working plans” and were drawn up by the SB units, contained information on "the threats" identified by the SB, indicated the main resources and objectives of the units' operative work planned for the given period, listed the operative cases being carried out, the planned operative and administrative undertakings, the persons responsible for carrying them out, the deadlines for their execution; executive plans referred to as "operative plan", drawn up periodically (or as required) for each operative case or broader or one-off undertakings and actions. 2. an executive plan drawn up for an operative case, a document in which the SB officer in charge of the operative case summarized the course of the case to date and information on the person(s) subjected to surveillance (and persons in contact with them) and – above all – listed the foreseeable threats related to the activities of the persons under surveillance, the operative needs related to the case (obtaining new sources of information, acquiring new collaborators or introducing previously used collaborators into the circle of the persons under surveillance, the need to set up a wiretap, the review of correspondence, etc.), the administrative action to be taken with regard to the person under surveillance and a list of tasks related to the above operative needs and planned actions. Operative plans usually had a standardized form, consisting of three parts: a summary of the status of the case to date, an analysis of operative needs, a list of tasks (in bullet points), accompanied – for each point – by a deadline for completion and the officer responsible for their execution. The operative point was approved by the head of the SB operative unit and included in the relevant case-files.

PODGLĄD I DOKUMENTACJA FOTOGRAFICZNA (PODGLĄD DOKUMENTOWANY FOTOGRAFICZNIE, PDF) | PHOTOGRAPHICALLY DOCUMENTED SURVEILLANCE

Podgląd dokumentowany fotograficznie (PDF) (photographically documented surveillance, PDF) a term for the covert observation of surveilled persons, objects, vehicles, etc., combined with photographing and/or filming them (using conventional methods, later also video recordings). The PDF was generally carried out from concealed observation points (zakryty punkt obserwacyjny, ZPO) and at so-called ambushes (zasadzka). The PDF was an operative technical measure. The PDF was arranged at the request of an operative unit approved by the Minister of the Internal Affairs, deputy ministers or the Chief Commander of the Citizens’ Militia (MO), or signed by the Chief of the Internal Military Service (WSW), Chief of the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, chiefs of the Directorate of the First and Third Executive of the WSW and WSW directorates in military districts. A PDF could be conducted for a maximum of one month, with the exception of PDFs against "objects under permanent surveillance". The PDF was handled by the Ministry of the Internal  Affairs Technical Department or, in the local Security Service (SB) units, by Divisions "T" or Sections "T" of the Operative Securing Divisions. The PDF was set up at the request (order) of the SB operative unit; the PDF was recorded in the register of orders for the installation of PP, PT, PTG, PDF facilities, register of exploited PP, PT, PTG, PDF facilities, register of exploitation material from PP, PT, PDF, PTG, TP facilities, with a separately kept PP, PT, PT, PTG, PDF object and installation dossier and a PDF exploitation dossier or the PDF installation dossier (by Division IV of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs Technical Department). The material obtained with the PDF (photographs and negatives, films) was handed over to the SB operative units, which ordered the PDF "in the format specified in the order"; the PDF videotapes were to be stored in the "T" division units for one month after they were made. The PDF documentation kept by the "T" division units was not recorded or archived in the "C" division but stored in the "T" division units and weeded there.

PODSŁUCH POKOJOWY (PP) | ROOM WIRETAPPING

Podsłuch pokojowy (Room wiretapping) (PP) a term used to describe both the listening devices installed in rooms of private flats and public buildings, offices, etc. and the activity, i.e. the covert listening in on the persons in these rooms (their occupants or users). The PP was an operative technical measure. The PP was set up following approval by the Minister of the Internal Affairs (or Deputy Ministers of the Internal Affairs or the Chief Commander of the Citizens' Militia –MO), application of directors or deputy directors of Departments I, II, III-A and IV and the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, Deputy Chief Commanders of the MO (for purposes of the Criminal Bureau and the Bureau for Combating Economic Crime), provincial commanders of the MO (from 1983, heads of the Provincial Office of the Internal Affairs – WUSW) and their deputies for security (i.e. SB heads), Chief of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the Border Protection Troops Command, director and deputy director of the Investigation and Inquiry Bureau of the Headquarters of the MO, and at requests signed by the Chief of the Internal Military Service (WSW), Chief of the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, chiefs of the Directorate of the First and Third Executive of the WSW and chiefs of WSW directorates in military districts. A wiretap could be active for a maximum of one month, with the exception of wiretaps set up in "objects under permanent surveillance" (e.g. flats of well-known opposition figures, episcopal curiae, diplomatic missions, etc.). The PP was set up, employed and removed by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs Technical Department or, in the local Security Service (SB) units, by Divisions "T" or Sections "T" of the Operative Securing Divisions. The PP was set up at the request (order) of the SB operative unit; the PP was recorded in the register of orders for the installation of PP, PT, PTG, PDF facilities, register of exploited PP, PT, PTG, PDF facilities, register of orders and exploitation of PP for "H" objects, register of exploitation material from of PP, PT, PDF, PTG, TP facilities, register of tapes recordings from PP, graphics of conversations from PP and PT. In many cases, the PP required setting up a reception point (punkt odbioru, PO) and transmission premises (lokal przejściowy, LP), which were arranged based on rules applicable to contact premises (lokal kontaktowy, LK) and secret flat (mieszkanie konspiracyjne, MK), as well as the covert entry to flats or other premises and the installation of listening devices in such a way as to make it impossible for the persons under surveillance or third parties to find them (or figure out that a wiretap had been installed). Information obtained from the PP was to be provided to the SB operative units in processed form, i.e. written notes and summaries; in special cases, complete wiretap transcripts or listening to a wiretap recording were allowed to be made available to the operative unit. The original PP material (cassette tapes) was kept by a "T" division unit for ten days after recording, after which it was weeded. The PP documentation kept by the "T" division units was not recorded or archived in the "C" division but held by the "T" division units and weeded there.

PODSŁUCH TELEFONICZNY (PT) | TELEPHONE WIRETAPPING

Podsłuch telefoniczny (Telephone wiretapping) (PT) a term used to describe both the act (of listening in) and listening devices that record telephone conversations (or allow them to be listened to on an ongoing basis) in secret from the persons conducting those conversations. The PT was an operative technical measure. The PT was set up at the request (order) of the operative unit of the Security Service (SB), Citizens' Militia (MO), Internal Military Service (WSW) of the military units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs and the Reconnaissance Division of the Border Protection Troops (WOP), approved by the directors or deputy directors of Departments I, II, III-A and IV and the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, directors of the Criminal Bureau and the Bureau for Combating Economic Crime of the Headquarters of the MO, provincial commanders of the MO (from 1983, heads of the Provincial Office of the Internal Affairs – WUSW) and their deputies for security (i.e. SB heads), Chief of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the Border Protection Troops Command, director and deputy director of the Investigation and Inquiry Bureau of the Headquarters of the MO, and at requests signed by the Chief of the WSW, Chief of the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, chiefs of the Directorate of the First and Third Executive of the WSW and chiefs of WSW directorates in military districts. A wiretap could be active for a maximum of one month, with the exception of wiretaps set up in "objects under permanent surveillance". The PT was set up, employed and removed exclusively by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs Technical Department or, in the local Security Service (SB) units, by Divisions "T" or Sections "T" of the Operative Securing Divisions. The PT was recorded in the register of orders for the installation of PP, PT, PTG, PDF facilities, register of exploited PP, PT, PTG, PDF facilities, register of exploitation material from PP, PT, PDF, PTG, TP facilities, graphics of conversations from PP and PT; with a separately kept PT, PTG installation and connection dossier and a PT, PTG, PDF object dossier. Information obtained from the PT was to be provided to the SB operative units in processed form, i.e. written notes and summaries; in special cases, complete wiretap transcripts or listening to a wiretap recording were allowed to be made available to the operative unit. The original PT material (cassette tapes) was kept by a "T" division unit for five days after recording, after which it was weeded. The PT documentation kept by the "T" division units was not recorded or archived in the "C" division but stored in the "T" division units and weeded there.

PODSŁUCH TELEGRAFICZNY (PTG) | TELEGRAPH WIRETAPPING

Podsłuch telegraficzny (Telegraph wiretapping) (PTG) a term for both the activity (copying telegrams and telex messages) and the devices that record and duplicate the content of telegrams and telex messages. The PTG was an operative technology measure. The PTG was handled by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs"s Technology Department or, in the local Security Service (SB) units, by Divisions "T" or Sections "T" of the Operative Protection Divisions. The PTG was set up at the request (order) of the operative unit of the SB, Citizens' Militia (MO), Internal Military Service (WSW) of the military units of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs and the Reconnaissance Division of the Border Protection Troops (WOP) approved by the directors or deputy directors of Departments I, II, III-A and IV and the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, directors of the Criminal Bureau and the Bureau for Combating Economic Crime of the Headquarters of the MO, provincial commanders of the MO (from 1983, heads of the Provincial Office of the Internal Affairs – WUSW) and their deputies for security (i.e. SB heads), Chief of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the Border Protection Troops Command, director and deputy director of the Investigation and Inquiry Bureau of the Headquarters of the MO, and at requests signed by the Chief of the WSW, Chief of the Second Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, chiefs of the Directorates of the First and Third Executive of the WSW and chiefs of WSW directorates in military districts. The PTG could be active for a maximum of one month, with the exception of wiretaps set up in "objects under permanent surveillance". The PTG activation was recorded in the register of orders for the installation of PP, PT, PTG, PDF facilities, register of exploited PP, PT, PTG, PDF facilities, register of exploitation material from PP, PT, PDF, PTG, TP facilities; with a separately kept PT, PTG installation and connection dossier and a PP, PT, PTG, PDF object dossier. Information obtained from the PTG was to be provided to the SB operative units in processed form, i.e. written notes and summaries; in special cases, printouts of intercepted telegrams or telex messages were allowed to be made available to the operative unit. The original PTG material (printouts) was kept by a "T" division unit for five days after generation, after which it was weeded. The PTG documentation kept by the "T" division units was not recorded or archived in the "C" division but stored in the "T" division units and weeded there.

PODSŁUCH ZEWNĘTRZNY (PEZEW) | EXTERNAL WIRETAPPING

Podsłuch zewnętrzny (External wiretapping) (PEZEW) a covert wiretap used exclusively during the surveillance of individuals by the "B" division units; "external wiretapping" most likely consisted of devices used to listen in on conversations in an open area. The "external PP" was used in "entertainment facilities, catering establishments, motor vehicles" and open spaces. The PEZEW was an operative technology measure; however, the "B" division units (in consultation with the "T" division units) were responsible for setting it up and using it.

PODTECZKA ROZPRACOWANIA OBIEKTOWEGO DEPARTAMENTU I MSW | SUB-DOSSIER OF OBJECT CASE-FILE OF THE DEPARTMENT I OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Podteczka rozpracowania obiektowego Departamentu I MSW (Sub-dossier of object case-file of the Department I of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs) files containing documentation concerning object surveillance run by Department I of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs (i.e. foreign intelligence branch) (when the conducted activities required widening the scope of the case); such sub-dossiers were given a separate registration number followed by the registration number of the main object case-file after the slash. This sub-dossier consisted of one chapter or five chapters in the case of a sub-dossier created by Divisions V, VI, VII and VIII of Department I of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, i.e. in the so-called division of scientific and technical intelligence (WNT).

POMOC OBYWATELSKA | CITIZEN ASSISTANCE

Pomoc obywatelska (Citizen assistance) non-formalised means of obtaining information that does not qualify as secret cooperation (see tajny współpracownik, secret collaborator). Citizen assistance included spontaneous or systematic denunciations (information but also opinions, suspicions, etc.) from persons who were not secret collaborators (TWs), including those in social or managerial positions and, in exceptional cases, anonymous ones. It was expected that the Security Service (SB) would not limit itself to accepting "citizen assistance" but would also actively seek such assistance, which meant, among other things, turning to people "whose help and discretion can be counted on" and with "a positive attitude and a favourable disposition towards the state authorities". "Citizen assistance" was to be kept confidential, was not to be reduced to merely providing information, but could also consist of "expressing [...] a professional opinion, providing access to documentation and even performing a certain activity" at the SB request. It was not expected that separate "citizen assistance" dossiers would be kept (no obligatory collection of written reports was required, the information obtained, etc. was to be placed directly in the operative case-files concerned), and persons providing "assistance" were not to be registered if "somewhat systematic contact" was not maintained with them. In fact, dossiers were set up for those providing "citizen assistance", in which documents concerning them and their reports or notes of conversations with them were collected. The categories of cooperation developed under "citizen assistance" were formalized in 1970.

POŁĄCZONY SYSTEM EWIDENCJI DANYCH O PRZECIWNIKU (PSED, SOUD) | SYSTEM OF JOINT ACQUISITION OF ENEMY DATA

Połączony System Ewidencji Danych o Przeciwniku (System of Joint Acquisition of Enemy Data) (PSED, SOUD) (PSED, Russian: Sistema Ob’edinennogo Ucheta Dannykh o Protivnike, SOUD) – a computerized system for recording information on persons considered dangerous by the foreign intelligence services of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Mongolia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, the USSR and the Polish People's Republic (PRL).

PRACA "W" | “W” WORK

Praca "W" (“W” work) secret inspection of postal items. The primary tasks of "W" work included detecting parcels and letters containing espionage information (and the methods used to transmit such messages), detecting "secret writing" (secret messages and microdots), intercepting postal items (and detecting communication methods) used "for ideological and political diversion", inspecting correspondence of persons under surveillance, obtaining handwriting specimens of persons under surveillance, officially intercepting correspondence (previously secretly opened) seized by order of a prosecutor's office or court from post offices, and finally carrying out activities to allow the official seizure of secretly opened postal items and their use for the formal launch of an investigation or as evidence in an ongoing investigation. A "W" work included carrying out secret inspections of correspondence under individual orders, ‘object orders’ and so-called thematic studies and demands to find and contact wanted persons (by inspecting correspondence and comparing handwriting patterns in retained or opened correspondence), marking correspondence with specific stamps and postmarks "for operative purposes", performing chemical analyses of mail to detect "secret mail". In fact, the "'W' work" consisted of habitual and illegal even under the Polish People's Republic's laws violations of secrecy of correspondence and manipulation of correspondence, and its definitions mentioned above – due to the repressive nature of the PRL legislation – enabled inspecting the entire postal circulation to intercept correspondence containing critical opinions of the PRL (or other countries of the Soviet bloc) and Marxist ideology, parcels with printed matter and books published abroad or outside the censorship, and in the case of persons under surveillance as part of operative cases – inspecting their entire correspondence, also concerning strictly private matters and not related to political, opposition, social, etc. activities. The term "'W' work" was used interchangeably with "postal censorship" and "correspondence surveillance".

PRZECHODZIĆ (OSOBA PRZECHODZĄCA) | TO PASS THROUGH; PERSON PASSING-THROUGH

Przechodzić (osoba przechodząca) (to pass through; person passing-through) in the Security Service (SB) jargon, the verb "to pass through" corresponded to the words "to appear", "to be listed". The terms "person passing-through in the case", "passing-through in the case", "passing-through in the file", "passing-through in the case material", "passing-through in material No. ..." denoted the person whose name was mentioned in the documents collected in a particular operative case file. It did not mean that the person was registered in the SB records (although it did not rule it out).

PSEUDONIM (PS.) | PSEUDONYM

Pseudonim (Pseudonym) (pseud.) a word by which a person was called to conceal his or her identity. A pseudonym was given to candidates for secret collaborator (KTW); secret collaborators (TWs) chose their own pseudonyms. In many cases, information on the choice of a pseudonym was part of the TW's letter of obligation to cooperate. Collaborators of other categories (operative contact, official contact, consultant) adopted pseudonyms but sometimes did not use them; they were referred to in Security Service (SB) documents by the initials of their surname and first name. Pseudonyms were also given to persons under surveillance as part of operative cases (at that time, they were identical to the case cryptonym) and to persons observed by intelligence officers of the "B" division – they were then referred to as "‘figurant’ [literally: figurehead; here: person under surveillance] pseud. ...". In the practice of Department I of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs (i.e. the SB intelligence), the assignment of pseudonyms to persons had to be agreed upon with the records and archives unit of the Department to avoid the repetition of pseudonyms and cryptonyms; the collaborators of Department I of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs would take pseudonyms that had sometimes already been used before – then they would sign their denunciations with the pseudonyms of their choice. At the same time, the officers of Department I of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs would supplement these pseudonyms with additional letters or digits distinguishing them from the others. Pseudonyms were intended to conceal the identity of the person using them; however, in many cases (especially when the pseudonym was chosen by a collaborator or when it concerned a person observed by the "B" division), they related to the person's surname, first name, personal, physical or psychological characteristics. The pseudonyms of persons under surveillance by the "B" division usually differed from those of the same persons given to them by the SB operative units and the cryptonyms for their operative cases.

PUNKT ODBIORU (PO) | RECEPTION POINT

Punkt odbioru (Reception point) (PO) a room used by the "T" (operative technology) units for the placement of equipment recording signals from listening devices (and potentially photographically documented surveillance, PDF). For secrecy reasons, the PO was arranged at a certain distance from the surveilled or wiretapped flats but in such a way that it was technically feasible to run transmission lines to them. POs were set up according to the rules applicable to setting up contact premises (LK); the owners of the flats where the PO was arranged were recruited and registered according to the rules applicable to the LK holders.